Lacking Leadership: Minerals Management Service

With the Obama administration facing its first crisis without a discernible opponent to discredit, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi recently offered up one solution. Blame Bush for the Minerals Management Service, which is the regulatory agency that oversees offshore drilling.

This time around, the excuse seems as desperate as her disgust over being asked whether she would donate hair to help. The reason her allegations seem disingenuous only requires a quick review of the facts.

Minerals Management Service Backgrounder

In the Gulf Coast, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) is partly responsible because it was the one agency that could have pulled the plug on the bad decisions being made. The agency didn't. Even when BP sent unusual rapid-fire requests to modify permits, the agency seemed to keep pace, approving some within as little as five minutes.

Neither BP nor Transocean has commented on the permit changes. And despite the promises of an administration to be more forthcoming and transparent, MMS declines to comment too. Perhaps nobody is talking because they all know the risks.

Sure, MMS had a track record of problems that came to light after the inspector general published a devastating report in 2008. The report revealed ethical lapses related to the MMS royalty collection program and officials at its Lakewood office who had engaged in drug use and sexual activities with industry insiders. But those problems do not necessarily lead to the crisis.

Contrary, according to previous statements from Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar, the agency had already been beaten into submission with reprimands, terminations, and criminal prosecutions. Salazar himself took the lead in reforming what he described as a corrupt culture. But after his house cleaning, it seems Salazar failed to fix the damage.

As soon as Elizabeth Birnbaum, who recently resigned, took charge of MMS about 10 months ago, she found a demoralized agency ill-equipped to meet the new priority of renewable energy. Clicking on the link to the MMS DOI Strategic Plan seems to confirm it. The return reads "file not found."

While there is no plan, it does seem Birnbaum cared and was trying to manage the leaderless agency, funneling most of her energy into offshore wind projects in the Atlantic. And, she wasn't afraid to speak on the Gulf Coast crisis. In fact, she was preparing to testify before a congressional panel about the agency's role in handling BP's massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. But Salazar's office didn't want her to testify. She resigned shortly after.

The Missed Opportunity For MMS

Despite its own negligence that contributed to the Deepwater Horizon crisis, standard communication protocol would have called for MMS to take charge of its communication much like the U.S. Food and Drug Administration took charge of the crisis created by the Peanut Corporation of America (PCA) in 2009. So why didn't it?

House Speaker Pelosi already provides the answer. Allowing MMS to become the point team on the crisis communication would have circumvented the administration's ability to deflect responsibility.

So instead of MMS (or the EPA as an alternative) taking the communication lead, the Department of the Interior all but silenced MMS before proceeding to break it up into parts. In place of a centralized communication channel, like we saw with the FDA or even FEMA in the wake of Katrina, the public is given a collection of sometimes contradictory statements about the crisis and who is in control.

Even at the special Deepwater Horizon Response Web site, it is unclear who is responsible for managing the content. It's every agency for themselves. There is no leadership.

Sure, the Deepwater Horizon Response site includes the 15 different agencies and companies that make up the Unified Command, but it does not assign any particular agency or company responsible for updates. While U.S. Coast Guard Adm. Thad Allen is now identified as the national incident commander, he was also the first to honestly admit that the federal government was not broadly "in charge."

It was this candid, honest response that prompted the American Spectator to call him the only adult on-scene commander for this disaster. Clearly, he ought to be charge if for no other reason than to stop the non-communication coming from Department of Interior, The White House, and other agencies. (Even this weekend, I received a news release from the EPA with nothing more than a visitation tally count among the President and other cabinet members.)

Why all the confusion? The reality seems to be that no one is in control of the spill or the cleanup. And the sheer lack of a centralized communication plan can only be indicative of a top-down failure to establish any centralized leadership.

The international community is just now seizing on this fact, noting that U.S. authorities took unnecessarily long to define the incident as a national disaster and failed to appreciate early enough that BP had no ready and obvious solution for stopping the leak. For them, it's all too obvious in the speeches being delivered by President Obama.

Obama seems to be waffling on whether to call BP a partner or public enemy number one. In one speech, he even drove home the point that his administration was in control but then stressed BP was letting him down as it called the shots. It can't be both. Or can it?

As investigations continue, the administration can expect the questions will become more and more difficult. The international community is already asking why the Obama administration was poised to open up more offshore drilling when they weren't confident in the regulatory agency overseeing it and without an emergency oil spill response plan.

So far, instead of answering those questions, President Obama has pledged to bring those responsible to justice. Ironically, such a move might include his administration; if not for the leak, then for the containment of it.

A special thanks to Geoff Livingston for inviting me to discuss some of these issues on his online radio show, EL Show, today. Tomorrow, we'll present some ideas on how the administration could attempt to turn the crisis communication failure around.

Remembering Those Who Lived: Memorial Day

"It is foolish and wrong to mourn the men who died. Rather we should thank God that such men lived." — General George S. Patton

The death of Marine Cpl. Jacob C. Leicht from Texas marked a grim reminder for most Americans that freedom comes at a price that is often paid by others. He was the 1,000th soldier killed in Afghanistan. In Iraq, the number of deaths reached 1,000 in October 2004. The Washington Post chronicles the fallen whereas the words of President Abraham Lincoln, written before the first Memorial Day (originally Decoration Day), remain among the most quoted for all those who came before them. I leave them for you today.

Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate -- we can not consecrate -- we can not hallow -- this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us -- that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion -- that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain -- that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom -- and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth. — President Abraham Lincoln

What else can be said, except to ask ourselves daily whether we still hold such resolve in high regard, that those men and women who have laid down their lives have done so in the name of freedom. We may hope.

Considering Content: Fresh Content Project

Over the last five years, dozens of bloggers have pinpointed four of the most critical elements — content, engagement, participation, community — for a "successful" and sustainable social media program. And yet, only a few of them understand that none of these elements exists in a bubble. They have to work together, plus one more.

Three out of five of these posts touch on what can easily be considered the fifth element, best defined as a mix of innovation and leadership. Listening to some social media experts, you might miss it as they tend to drone on about being submissive to consumers. These authors, on the other hand, get it right. At some point, you have to lead.

The other two posts are perfect examples, as they take the lead in dispelling two common social media myths: that extensions like blogspot, wordpress, and typepad are always bad and affiliate marketing does not always have to be considered evil. At the same time, you might also take away that content, engagement, participation, community, and leadership/innovation trump whether or not you have a blog extension or participate in an affiliate marketing program.

Best Fresh Content In Review, Week of May 17

• Don't Just Show Up (Participation), Step It Up (Innovation).
Christina Kerley calls it right when she writes that communicators ought not to be overly dazzled by the various platforms that serve up content on the Web. They are innovation, but the creation, content, and communities applied to the space can be equally innovative. Participation is always an excellent first step to understand an existing online community, but it requires more than participation from marketers to shine.

• Affiliate Marketing And Its Bad Reputation.
"Affiliate marketing had a bad reputation, the history of which seems to echo forward," writes Chris Brogan. "A lot of the blogging crowd, especially those with a PR background strongly dislike the use of affiliate marketing." The conversation stems in part from the age-old argument of just how much editorial needs to be separated from advertising, with Brogan falling on the pro-affiliate marketing side with proper disclosure. Public relations hates it sometimes because they like to get ink free.

• A First-Ever Look At The Top Blogger.com Wordpress.com & Typepad.com Blogs.
Jason Falls provides an in-depth review of various subdomains, blogs which have an extension attributed to the online software that powers them. (This blog did for years, until a few weeks ago). In reviewing the various top blogs that still retain their extensions, it seems extensions have little bearing on cumulative Postrank engagement scores as opposed to the size of the audiences that authors reach.

• 10 Ways To Be Referential.
Referential means containing a reference or pointing to and involving a referent. And Adam Singer provides 10 ways to become a referent, including being consistent within a topic field, taking a lead position in conversations, and sharing little known ideas or accepting an unpopular view. His tenth point is the best for bloggers: analyze and contextualize the information from your unique vantage point. The next fresh pick provides the example.

• 10 Things Julius Caesar Could Have Taught Us About Business, Marketing, Leadership.
By blending his own views and history with an emphasis on quotes and concepts from Julius Caesar, Olivier Blanchard delivers an entertaining and engaging piece of prose that still makes sense of the average business person or blogger today. The second point, that people want to be led and not controlled, is especially timely. There are plenty of people — business owners, executives, and even parents — who have a difficult time understanding the difference between the two. Blanchard and Caesar help put it into perspective.

Shifting Communication: Transocean Acts Under Siege

Much like Halliburton, the Transocean Web site remains unchanged by the Gulf Coast oil spill.

The most haunting page of all falls under the tab of responsibility. "At Transocean, we firmly believe that the safety of people underpins our success. Our safety vision above covers all our drilling units and shore-based facilities worldwide." And then there is the promise in big bold letters splash across the page as the header.

"Our operations will be conducted in an incident-free workplace, all the time, everywhere."

It's not just a headline by Transocean. It's also the company's vision statement.

Just off the front page, the only section mentioning drilling rig Deepwater Horizon is under news releases. All of its communication there has been a steady stream of releases, with an emphasis on the event from April 21 to April 26. April 26 marks the day that Transocean communication decisively changes.

The Communication Snap At Transocean.

What changed? Transocean shifts from crisis communication to increasingly defensive protectionism. After sending a message to investors that the total insured value of the rig is $560 million on April 26, releases shift to a limitation of liability petition for approximately $26 million as a necessary step to protect the interests of its employees, its shareholders and the company.

After that decisive turn, most communication becomes reactionary to rumors and the news reporting on those rumors, including the alleged distribution of any incident response forms that promised cash for cooperation. Four days later, Cheryl D. Richard, senior vice president of human resources and IT, announces her pending retirement.

The next and last communication, on May 25, responds to what it calls erroneous reports relating to its "shareholders' approval of a dividend and its intent to avoid liability arising from the Deepwater Horizon incident or to profit from such incident." The release goes on to say that "Transocean will honor all of its legal obligations arising from the Deepwater Horizon accident."

A statement seems to contradict its limitation of liability petition. Meanwhile, the company's online newsletter Beacon, appears frozen in winter 2010, filled with letters of praise. It's biannual employee publication is frozen even earlier; the last available issue published in 2008.

Coincidently, perhaps, 2008 also seems to represent a shift in company behavior. Between 2008 and 2009, Transocean went from a hot stock pick to a company that seemed to move away from the aforementioned safety-laced vision. The company had five management appointments, two vice president appointments, and a change in the nation where it is incorporated. It moved from the Cayman Islands to Switzerland.

The Transocean Connection To The Spill.

For those who might not know, Transocean was the owner and operator of Deepwater Horizon. As such, Lamar McKay, the president and chairman of BP, has alluded that the blame belongs there (despite BP accepting responsibility for the cleanup). Transocean CEO Steve Newman responded by saying it was not the time for finger pointing ... before attempting to shift blame away from his own embattled company.

If there is any truth to some of the stories surfacing in papers today, the Deep Horizon incident plays out like many construction contractor-subcontractor relationships.

Subcontractors sometimes drag their feet, which places pressure on the supervising contractor to exert influence. In one summary offered up by the Huffington Post, which criticizes the absence of two key testimony witness, it seems to be the most logical scenario, with "Donald Vidrine, BP's 'company man,' overruled the rig's chief mechanic and driller and pushed to speed up the process by remove the drilling mud faster to save BP money on the day of the tragic explosion."

It would make sense, given many of the initial delays were related to the Halliburton slowdown. However, there is one write-up that smacks of perception. If oil rigs are anything like ships, BP could probably not overrule a chief mechanic and put Transocean at risk unless the owner-operator was predisposed or ordered to follow contractual obligations and ignore the company's eroding vision to allow safety to lead to success.

The Psychology Of Influence And Erosion Of Communication.

If you worked as a pizza delivery driver and the boss told you to drive 20 miles per hour over the speed limit to shave 15 minutes off the delivery time, you might be inclined to say no. Some people might even say hell no. On Deepwater Horizon, Transocean said yes.

Once again, it seems Milgram was right. The question that ought to be asked is what convinced a chief mechanic and driller to change his mind? Was it mounting pressure from BP? Was it the lack of communication or a direct order from his company? Or was it the authorization to proceed from the regulatory agency's approval to proceed?

Answer that question andprimary party responsibility seems to land squarely. However, that is not to say the balance of participants are to be exonerated. Guilt doesn't wash off as well as oil.

From the perspective of communication alone, Transocean seems to have the most to lose. It's clearly the most defensive, sometimes flailing about. There must be a reason. Sometimes those actions are the sign of inexperienced communicators or crisis counsel. Other times, it's merely an admission that the company hasn't been observing its vision for the better part of two years.

We'll pick up on our crisis communication evaluation next Tuesday. Mostly, we're just thrilled the real priority, plugging the leak, seems to be working. In the interim, consider some other worthwhile perspectives.

• Geoff Livingston pinpoints where BP communication becomes muddled. It's an excellent point-by-point resource primer.

• Patrick Kinney of Gaffney Bennet Public Relations talks to Lynn Neary about BP's public response to the Gulf oil spill. Kinney worked for Ogilvy Public Relations when it helped BP rebrand itself as "Beyond Petroleum."

• Chris Maloney pens one post that pinpoints what BP seems to be doing right since taking full responsibility for the spill. His writeup is a bit more tempered than those who gave BP a B on crisis communication. (A "B," really? Not in my class.)

Communicating Zip: Why Halliburton Is Quiet

When you visit the Halliburton Web site, one of the world’s largest providers of products and services to the energy industry, business continues as usual.

The board declared a 2010 second quarter dividend of nine cents ($0.09) a share on the company’s common stock, the Gulf of Mexico remains "one of the world's most prolific producing areas," the company was busy presenting at the 2010 UBS Global Oil and Gas Conference, and the deep water drilling section of the site concludes "our experience speaks for itself."

Mostly, with exception to the prepared statement (one release away from being bumped off the home page) that was delivered by Tim Probert, president, Global Business Lines and chief Health, Safety and Environmental officer, Halliburton, the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico already reads like a memory rather than a current event. It's not.

The Halliburton Connection To The Spill.

Halliburton connection to the crisis is that it was responsible for sealing the well. The casing to seal the well was installed several days before the explosion. (CNN provides one of the better investigation time lines for April 20, if you are interested.)

What makes the casing significant is most accounts point to gas leaking through the casing just hours before the explosion. This seems to be supported by BP briefs as rig workers tried to close valves on the blowout preventer at least twice.

However, there are four points to consider related to the casing. Only one point falls squarely on Halliburton.

1. BP's decision to install a single barrier option made the best economic case.
2. There are some contentions that the Halliburton work was taking longer than usual and possibly improperly constructed .
3. BP seems to have made a decision to perform some tasks related to the last plug in reverse order, something that would require MMS approval.
4. BP officials had made a decision to run only six of 21 tests to ensure the drill pipe was properly centered; an uneven drill pipe could have contributed to the instability of the installation.

The Halliburton Postion And Communication Strategy.

The Halliburton position is that it was following Transocean’s orders (as dictated by BP) and is "contractually bound to comply with the well owner’s instructions on all matters relating to the performance of all work-related activities." It has simultaneously defended its work while also claiming it is premature and irresponsible to speculate on any specific causal issues.

In terms of ongoing communication, other than saying it is cooperating with investigations and releasing its investigation statement, the company is silent. While Halliburton is providing some intervention support to help secure the damaged well and planning and services associated with drilling relief well operations, details are absent.

Public relations professionals and crisis communicators generally hate this communication approach. The reality is that such little communication from Halliburton is indicative of a subcontractor role. Crisis communicators don't generally teach it, but subcontractors generally attempt to position themselves as subordinates.

The benefit for the subcontractor is limited responsibility for the communication. The benefit for the contractor is greater message control. In this case, Halliburton has mostly used its communication to send a message to BP and Transocean. That message is clear: it's your show unless you try to toss us under the bus.

Halliburton Communication Overview.

• Of the three companies, Halliburton is in the best possible position to escape the bulk of the backlash. It seems to know it, because even if the investigation shows its work may be the primary cause, the primary cause on its own did not result in a disaster. Several decisions leading up to and after the installation seem to have led to significant lapses in safety.

• The subcontractor communication strategy — based on the observation that the general public is not the customer — is becoming an arcane practice. While subcontractors have been traditionally exempt from the most rules of communication, the general public has become increasingly critical of subcontractors since the advent of social media.

• There are still weaknesses in Halliburton's communication. Given prior public exposure, the public is beginning to remember its name as a controversial and untrustworthy corporate citizen. Further, the excuse, "just following orders," seems as thin as medical personnel who relied on it during another crisis we covered two years ago.

• The most challenging concept for communicators to grasp is that the greatest threat to Halliburton is not tied to public pressure. It is only tied to how future contractors perceive their communication and cooperation during the crisis.

Since the company's survival rate is mostly based on how contractors view their cooperation, it seems likely that this company will once again survive controversy while employing a situational communication strategy that most communicators would not recommend. What could it do better?

Even for a subcontractor remaining mostly silent, Halliburton could have shored up communication on four fronts. Among them: communicating policies to ensure safe working conditions despite contractor "orders," avoiding any speculation in the testimony as opposed to what can only be called selective speculation, providing BP updates to roll on their site despite their own silence, and better communicating its role in cleanup efforts as a BP partner in being part of the solution.

In 2009, Halliburton’s total cash and in-kind donations amounted to $572 million. It would only make sense to earmark some of these funds toward a cleanup effort the company is at least partly responsible for.

Managing Crisis: Bad PR Is Only A Symptom

Any time a crisis involves a natural disaster, environmental catastrophe, or drawn-out tragedy, there is only one point of discussion.

When is it going to stop?

Transparency? It doesn't matter. Who is at fault? It doesn't matter. Is the federal government doing enough? It doesn't matter.

Sure, those questions are bound to be asked and asked again. Thirty-seven days is a long time to be in the midst of a crisis with multiple events. And during that time, when specific event coverage can no longer hold viewer interest, investigations start and second tier questions bubble up. But all stories always come back to that singular question. When is it going to stop?

It's the primary reason that for any communication offered up by one of the world's largest energy companies, it always circles back to live shots of oil spilling into the Gulf of Mexico from the ocean floor. It always ends with oil washing up on the shore. It always comes back to the impact on animals and sea life or the disruption of life for residents who live within the path.

This isn't "Obama's Katrina" as some people like to call it. Katrina was over, from the time it was upgraded to a tropical storm, in five days.

The oil spill is not an event. It's multiple events.

If there is one fatal flaw in the communication strategy by BP, the Obama administration, and dozens of other vested and guilty parties, it is that they have neglected to see the obvious. This crisis is not a singular event. It's a multiple event crisis, with each event requiring a different set of answers for first tier questions.

• Provide updates and estimates related to the time and date of the event.
• Determine the what, when, where, how, and why.
• Determine who will be involved and to what extent.
• Determine the public or environmental risk of each event.
• Determine the extent of any property damage and loss of life.
• Determine which authorities will be on the scene of each event.
• Estimate and create action plans when each specific crisis will be resolved.
• Keep providing updates, with any positive outcomes, until it is resolved.

Isolating each event related to the crisis is critical if anyone hopes to manage it. Otherwise, the culmination of unrelated events will overwhelm any singular or tag team entity much like Toyota's sometimes unrelated recalls that eventually added up into a company that lost its way.

As a visual, the greater mass of the oil crisis might be likened to a giant blob that BP is attempting to hold up on its own while other vested parties stand by hoping for the best. It's not possible. Crisis and communication blobs do not act like solid mass. They act more like oil. It slips. It drips. And eventually it will coat everyone involved. It doesn't matter who gets more soiled.

Instead, the entire crisis needs to be broken up into parts. There is the leak, which was the initial cause of the crisis. There is the oil that has already seeped into the ocean, killing wildlife, damaging fishermen, and halting tourism. There are scores of smaller events that impact specific ecosystems, local communities, and residents.

The first tier priority is to stop the leak. Until then, nothing else matters.


The second tier, which occurs simultaneously, is to contain the spread of the oil and disperse it. BP is managing this effort, but relying on support from the Coast Guard and hired local fishermen. The results to date are mixed, with some unexpected consequences to the individuals exposed to chemicals.

The third tier are the dozens of events that occur anywhere oil washes up on shore. BP is attempting to mange this aspect of the spill as well. It's clearly not working, with impacted states beginning to take the heat for not doing enough.

A reorganization of the entire process is badly needed. BP clearly needs to focus its energy on stopping the leak. The federal government needed to and still needs to step up responsibility and take action on mitigating the the impact of the oil that has already escaped instead of attempting to armchair quarterback the scene with conflicting messages. And local state governments ought to have taken the lead on individual events, with support from various environmental groups, to keep the beaches clear and clean up as the oil made landfall.

Sure, BP could still act as consultants on the second and third tier events, increasing its presence as each event is resolved. And they ought not to be acting alone. Some of the companies that have a partial responsibility are all but silent on the issue.

And the blame game? Who cares about that?

Considering the amount of oil that has spilled into the Gulf Coast, the top kill solution (if it works) is only the beginning of the environmental events to come. The blame will eventually come to light as investigations continue. What will also be the subject of great debate is why the federal government sought to look like it was in control early on, but then demonstrated only a presence.

Public relations alone cannot solve such a crisis alone. Neither can the various boycotts. If anything, boycotts could make the situation worse despite the reasons some people say to move ahead.

Healthier ways to participate in the crisis at this time include any number of efforts. One beneficiary of a satirical Twitter account BPGlobalPR is to raise funds for the Gulf Restoration Network. The boycotts, if any, can wait until after the spill.

Public relations is always reliant on the actual plan.

When any plan to deal with a crisis is bad, the symptom is improper communication. For its part, BP has attempted to keep communication channels flowing, but it is clearly holding back. They seem to be focused on a singular thought that if they fix everything and then prove themselves to be only partly to blame, then they may be able to justify the clean green logo.

However, as Geoff Livingston points out, that is not the case. He writes that the collective "crisis PR has been terrible with missteps on resolution, horrific transparency on possible solutions, false accounting of actual daily oil spill amounts, the policing of beaches to prevent media reporting, bickering between BP and the EPA, dispersants’ negative impact, a new climate bill that endorses further off-shore drilling, 19 new off-shore drilling licenses since Deep Horizon, etc., etc., on and on."

He says the crisis might be insurmountable for the company. I'm not sure yet, but only because BP is much more than BP. BP is Castrol, Arco, Aral, am/pm, and even the Wild Bean Cafe. It's also a leader in biofuel technology. It's investing in solar technology. It's investing in wind. It's investing in emerging coal conversion technologies. And the list goes on.

You won't read about many of these efforts for the time being. BP is smart enough to keep the focus where is belongs, but there is more to the company than meets the eye. Where it is less adept, obviously, is in its ability to work beyond its internal sphere. Perhaps they think they are too big to do that nowadays. But they are not the only ones.

Generally, in the past, sometimes the federal government would be slow to take charge and delegate a national disaster. But ultimately, the federal government would. This time around, the crisis plan matches the PR plan. Every stakeholder in the oil spill crisis has its own message. And while it is said in many different ways, the underlying theme is "not me."

Other voices around the Web with a focus on communication.

• The Dirty Business of BP's Corporate Reputation Clean Up by Jennifer Janviere.
• Its Fake Twitter Stream Has Twice the Followers of the Real Thing by Jim Edwards
• How Not To Get “Brandjacked” Like BP Global PR by Olivier Blanchard